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Abstract In order to keep in good long-term relationships with their main customers,8
Airline Cargo companies do not impose any fee for last minute cancellations of shipments.9
As a result, customers can book the same shipment on several cargo companies. Cargo10
companies try to balance cancellations by a corresponding volume of overbooking. However,11
the considerable uncertainty in the number of cancellations does not allow to fine-tune12
the optimal overbooking level, causing losses. In this work, we show how the deployment13
of cryptographic techniques, enabling the computation on private information of customers14
and companies data can improve the overall service chain, allowing for striking and enforcing15
better agreements. We propose a query system based on proxy re-encryption and show how16
the relevant information can be extracted, still preserving the privacy of customers’ data.17
Furthermore, we provide a Game Theoretic model of the use case scenario and show that18
it allows a more accurate estimate of the cancellation rates. This supports the reduction of19
the uncertainty and allows to better tune the overbooking level.20
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1 Introduction23
One of the main problems in air cargo revenue management is the modeling24
of overbooking and cancellation in the operation of the service chain, which25
involves air-cargo carrier companies (ACCs) and their clients, the freight for-26
warder companies (FFs). Together with shippers, they are the main players in27
the air-cargo chain. ACCs operate flights on which cargo loads are transported;28
FFs buy in advance bulk cargo capacity and sell it to individual shippers, con-29
solidate smaller shipment into larger units and deliver them to ACCs by agreed30
dates (only few shippers are direct customers of the ACCs [9]).31
There are two mechanisms used by ACCs for selling capacity: pre-allocation32
sale and ad-hoc sale. In terms of financial market terminology, the pre-allocation33
sale corresponds to a long term forward contract between the FF and the ACC,34
where the former commits to buy in the future the agreed capacity (specific35
volume or weight on a specific flight and date). The ad-hoc sale corresponds36
to a spot-market sale, without prior commitments. The original purpose of the37
long term forward contracts is to grant to the ACC some paid capacity and38
compensate the FFs for their loss of flexibility by means of price breaks. Be-39
fore the start of each season (a predefined time interval, typically of the order40
of few months) ACCs allocate cargo capacity to FFs on that season’s flights.41
Capacity sold to a FF in this manner is called an allotment or allotted capacity42
[24]. FFs typically book cargo weight, or volume, on a specific flight several43
weeks in advance. However, for several reasons, the cargo load might fail to44
be delivered to the ACC by the scheduled date (this event is called no-show ),45
or might undergo severe volume or weight reduction : those two contingencies46
cause a waste of capacity to the ACC (called spoilage). Globally the problem47
of spoilage reduction is referred to as the cargo airline cancellation problem.48
Typically, ACCs try to balance this problem by overbooking the flight (i.e.49
in selling more capacity than the one is actually admissible on the flight);50
however an excess of overbooking w.r.t. the actual amount of cancellation can51
result in some loads not being carried (this problem is called off-loading),52
with consequent economic losses (contractual penalties, storage or re-routing53
charges). The problem of balancing cancellation and overbooking, and of re-54
ducing the associated risk, is studied in revenue management, and dealt with55
using a wide spectrum of approaches (see for instance [24], [22] and references56
therein).57
Trying to reduce the cancellation rate is, naturally, at the core of most ap-58
proaches. Some ACCs introduced a cancellation fee on those air cargo bookings59
that are cancelled within three days from departure, so as to deter cancella-60
tions; however, due to the forces acting within this specific market, this coun-61
termeasure is difficult to enforce with every customer: in order to keep in good62
long-term relationships with their main customers - typically large FFs - most63
ACCs do not impose fines for last minute cancellations. In practice, large FFs64
pay only for the capacity they actually use [5].65
As a result, a large FF can: (1) book a departure time where the cargo66
might not be ready, or book an optimistically large volume, which is unlikely67
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to be filled (we refer to this behavior as excess reservation) or, even, (2) book68
on several cargo companies the transportation of the same cargo (we refer to69
this behaviour as multiple reservation).70
Excess reservation is mainly motivated by the opportunity to exploit the71
possible upward demand fluctuations on a volatile shipment market; other less72
openly acknowledged motivations for this behavior by freight forwarders is the73
purpose to block out competitors [1]. Excess reservation is thus one of the main74
causes of weight/volume reduction.75
Multiple reservation, instead, is a way for exploiting the downward price76
fluctuations on the cargo spot-market and it implies at least two bookings by77
a FF for the same cargo load: a booking with a first ACC through a long-term78
forward contract and a booking with a second ACC through a short-term79
contract on the spot market [27]. Multiple reservation is one of the causes of80
no-show. Notice, that we assume that a load can be uniquely identified by81
source, destination, dates, weight and volume and its other features declared82
at booking time: this information forms the descriptor of the load. We posit83
that even if on the spot market a smaller weight or volume is booked for the84
cargo by a FF, the occurrence of a multiple reservation can be assessed.85
Excess reservation and multiple reservation have thus, very different char-86
acters. However they have one element in common: hidden information plays87
an important role in the motivations. We will develop this point further. Before88
doing this, it is important to mention – as noticed, for instance, by Hellermann89
[22, 23] – that the right of a forwarder to cancel without penalty, is equivalent90
to ”having signed a forward contract, but holding in fact a call option on the91
allotted capacity”: this option gives the right, but not the obligation, to buy92
the allotted capacity. The approach proposed by Hellerman is to take that93
contract for what actually is: to formalize it as an option contract and to give94
it a suitable pricing, computed using option theory.95
The approach followed in the present paper is different, in that we propose96
to leverage part of the hidden information by means of privacy preserving97
computing techniques, so as to remove some inefficiencies of the market, and98
move market players toward a different equilibrium.99
1.1 Leveraging hidden information100
Our point, indeed, is that part of the information unknown to the parties is101
just hidden information, i.e. information available to individual parties, but102
that cannot be disclosed, for market confidentiality reasons. If at least part103
of that information could be elicited, without compromising confidentiality,104
to obtain publicly sharable information, the fairness of the process could be105
considerably improved.106
In other words, market forces, exploiting the principle of confidentiality are107
currently producing an unfair share of the risk, between FFs and ACC, even108
though the parties are working within the same supply chain. Letting some109
hidden information surface, could allow the invocation of strong principles such110
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as rightfulness, and make the share of the risk among the parties less unfair.111
Typically, if an indicator of the non-justifiability/rightfulness/legitimacy of112
a given behavior could be made available (without violating confidentiality)113
most dysfunctional behaviors could be assigned a penalty by an enforceable114
contract, thus discouraging that behavior.115
With respect to excess reservation, the hidden information concerns the116
actual capacity demand by the suppliers: this information can be forecast,117
based on private information known to FFs and not to ACCs: making available118
this information in aggregated form to the ACCs could help the latter to tune119
the overbooking. We return to this point in the Discussion and Conclusions120
section: our focus here is on the multiple reservation problem.121
With respect to multiple reservation, at shipment time, the hidden infor-122
mation, known by the FF, but not by the ACC, consists in whether the FF123
has actually sent the load through another ACC. This information, though,124
is present in the airlines company cargo records. An ACC could impose, by125
contract, to a FF that it will not book the same cargo over more ACCs (in126
exchange, the ACC could offer incentives in the form of moderate discounts127
in case the spot price falls below some threshold). This is a condition that a128
FF could agree to accept, even if it restricts its operational freedom: indeed,129
it is unlikely that a FF defends the right to no-shows motivated by the use of130
alternative ACC for the very same cargo. To support the enforcement of such131
condition one can set up a privacy-preserving search engine system. In case of132
no show, the system can be queried, to check whether the event results from133
using an alternative ACC: if that is the case, the FF incurs a penalty. The134
adoption of such solution is beneficial for cargo companies: protection against135
this type of dysfunctional behavior is mutual interest of all the airline cargo136
companies, even though they are competitors.137
Such privacy preserving query system can be supported either by a trusted138
party managed ledger, or by a real time query computation mechanism over a139
distributed dataset. In general, techniques based on secure multi-party com-140
putation enable different parties to perform distributed computation on secret141
inputs: following this paradigm, it is possible to compute any public function142
and share the output among the parties, while preserving the privacy of the143
inputs: after the execution of the protocol each party does not learn anything144
more than the computed values.145
In this paper we propose a privacy preserving query system that protects146
users’ data, still allowing the detection of misbehavior from one of the partici-147
pants. Synergies between ACCs and their customer FFs and synergies among148
ACCs motivate the adoption of the above described solutions: the cost of such149
audit system could be shared among the participants.150
Hereafter we develop the design of the system to contrast the problem of151
multiple reservations: we plan to discuss in a future work the problem of excess152
reservation and the corresponding solution. Thus, the main contributions of153
the present work is the description of an audit system for multiple reservation154
detection based on cryptographic techniques.155
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1.2 Game Theoretic Modeling156
Obviously, such an audit system has a cost, not only for its construction and157
deployment, but also for its operation. It is well known that some SMC queries158
can be rather expensive and time consuming. Some important elements to159
take into account are the following: in the business scenario described, the160
burden of the proof is upon the ACC, i.e. the ACC has to pay for the audit,161
so as to prove that the cancellation is illegitimate, in order to apply a fine;162
furthermore, cancellations happen rather frequently and most of the time they163
do not correspond to multiple booking. Consequently it is impractical and164
can be economically disadvantageous for the ACC to run a audit at each165
cancellation: the ACCs can afford, instead, the adoption of a random sampling166
schema (randomness is used to grant non-predictability). Thus, not all the167
violations will be detected. This fact is know to the FFs, which can count on168
some level of impunity, depending on the audit rate of by the ACC. In turn,169
the ACC is aware of this possibility for the FFs and might try to tune the170
audit rate consequently.171
Such an interdependent decision landscape – where the system consists of172
selfish players with non-aligned interests – can be effectively modeled by using173
Game Theory (GT). The problem of building selfish-resilient collaborative174
systems is often approached using Game Theory [10, 11, 12, 14, 16], also in175
relation to the control of private information release in Supply Chains and the176
associated risk [2, 3, 6, 8, 13, 15, 20].177
By means of GT, under suitable hypotheses about the rationality of the178
players, one is able to predict, at least statistically, the players’ behaviour in179
specified circumstances: such joint behavior (called Nash equilibrium) consists180
in a collection of strategies (one for each player) from which no player has181
incentives to deviate unilaterally (since this would not increase its personal182
payoff). The above outlined misbehaviour/auditing scenario, can be mapped183
to a specific class of GT models: Inspection Games (IGs). In this type of games184
an inspector controls the correct behaviour of an inspectee, and applies a fine if185
a misbehaviour is detected during the inspection. GT modeling allows to find186
the rate of violation and the rate of inspection at equilibrium, as a function of187
the parameters of the problem.188
At their core, the multiple reservation by the FF and the audit by the ACC189
can be modeled as a (non-coalitional) two-player inspection game. By using190
such a model, we show that FFs and ACCs, if acting rationally, would adopt,191
respectively, a specific rate of violation and a specific rate of inspection: the192
two rates depend on the parameters of the problem. Those parameters are: cost193
of individual inspections, quantitative damage inflicted by a violation, benefit194
to the violator and value of the fine. The computation of the rate of violation195
by the FFs allows the ACCs to reduce the relative uncertainty in the estimate196
of the overall cancellation rate, thus improving the estimate of the necessary197
overbooking rate to be used as a countermeasure. Notice, in passing, that in198
this case, the players’ rationality is a sound assumption: whereas individuals,199
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forced to take decisions under condition of uncertainty, often act irrationally,200
profit oriented organizations tend in general to act rationally.201
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the scenario, the system202
solution and the corresponding protocol are formally defined; in Section 3203
the Game Theoretic Model of the use case is developed and the equilibrium204
solution is given; there, we also point out how the system can reduce the205
relative error cancellation rate estimate; a brief discussion of the future work,206
in Section 4 concludes the paper.207
2 The multiple reservation detection model208
We model the multiple reservation detection as a query returning a boolean209
value, which represents the presence of a given descriptor in a database. This210
can be modeled as querying the database resulting from the union of the211
databases owned by each participant. Note that those databases hold sensi-212
tive data that cannot be shared in public, since the disclosure could affect213
the business of the involved parties (competitors could take advantage of the214
information offering lower prices and increasing their market shares).215
The solution we propose is based on proxy re-encryption in a cloud-based216
scenario. In the next subsection we give an introduction to this cryptographic217
technique.218
2.1 Cloud-based Proxy Re-encryption Schemes219
In the last years, the provision of a secure and efficient data-sharing system220
on the cloud has been challenging several researchers, who want to comple-221
ment the reliability and availability of cloud-based storage systems, with the222
privacy requirements that must be satisfied when the shared data contain sen-223
sible information [32]. One of the possible solutions to the data sharing problem224
comes from the deployment of proxy re-encryption (PRE) schemes, where a225
semi-trusted proxy holding a re-encryption key translates a message encrypted226
under a public key into the encryption of the same message under a different227
public key. In this setting, firstly introduced by Blaze et al. in 1988 [7], the228
proxy is not able to learn anything about the encrypted message. The cloud229
provider can in some cases act as the proxy agent that runs the re-encryption230
algorithm to translate the cipher-texts of the sender to the cipher-texts en-231
crypted using the public key of the receiver, so that the receiver can read232
the data using his own decryption key. The security of the underlying PREs233
provides the guarantee that anyone else (including the cloud) cannot access234
private data. In literature several examples of PREs have been provided to se-235
curely share data on public clouds [25, 31]. Proxy re-encryption has been used236
also to construct keyword search technique [17] where users can re-encrypt an237
encrypted message using different keys held by the other participants to the238
scheme. The scheme provided by Dong et al. generates a trapdoor for the user239
A cryptographic cloud-based approach 7
keyword that is used by the proxy server to find a match in the encrypted240
data. More recently, Sepehri et al. [28, 29] addressed the problem of privacy-241
preserving equality queries over horizontally partitioned data among multiple242
owners adopting a proxy re-encryption scheme. They experimentally imple-243
mented the key translation process, and computed the time needed to bring244
data encrypted with different keys under the same key, utilizing El-Gamal en-245
cryption system. In this work we re-adapt this scheme to build a cloud-based246
solution for the air cargo cancellation problem.247
2.2 Problem Definition248
We consider the air cargo service chain scenario, where the freight forwarders249
(FFs) can book cargo weight or volume on a specific flight from air carrier250
companies (ACCs). We recall that usually, freight forwarders have long term251
contracts with ACCs, which for this reason do not impose any fee for last252
minute cancellations of forwarders’ shipments. This benefit for FFs may lead to253
two main events: no-show event, when the cargo is not delivered to the airline254
by the scheduled date by a FF (cancellation); reduction event, in which a strong255
reduction of volume or weight is operated by a FF. Both those contingencies256
cause a waste of capacity to the ACCs. In this study we focus on the former257
event, and in particular on the case in which no-show events occur: for instance,258
given two ACCs, 1 and 2, some FFs may move their shipments from 1 to 2259
at the last minute (for the sake of simplicity we call this behavior contractual260
violation or simply violation), e.g. because 2 has lower shipping costs. In this261
case, we propose a scheme to detect violations from FFs.262
Let ACC = {ACC1, . . . , ACCm} denote a group of air carrier companies263
with m > 1. Each carrier ACCi has a table Ti from a collection of hori-264
zontally partitioned data T = {T1, . . . , Tm} for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For the sake of265
conciseness and clarity, we suppose each Ti contains one searchable attribute266
Ti,A = Cargo Id and w extra attributes Ti,B1,...,Bw ; say Ti,B1 = Origin,267
Ti,B2 = Destination, Ti,B3 = V olume/Weight, and Ti,B4 = Flight Id, re-268
spectively.269
Given a query v = CargoId of a no-show cargo, the output of this equality270
test is a set of all tuples with extra attributes Ti,B1,...,B4 whose searchable271
attribute value is equal to the v. If the result of the query is not empty, a272
violation event has occurred.273
2.3 System Model274
Here, we consider a cloud based search system with multiple data owners as275
shown in Figure 1. There are five types of entities in our system:276
1. Data owners (e.g., ACCs), each ACC locally encrypts its data with its277
private key and uploads it to the proxy server,278
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Fig. 1 Overall view of our system model with 2 air cargo carrier and 1 freight forwarder
2. Trusted Authority (TA), a fully trusted server that is responsible for gener-279
ating random keys for data owners and authorized users. It also assigns a280
global identifier GId to each cargo booking requested by a certain FF ,281
3. Proxy server, an honest-but-curious server that converts owners’ record en-282
crypted with different keys to the ones under the same key,283
4. Authorized users, an ACC inspector as an authorized user submits query284
over relations stored on the cloud server,285
5. Cloud service provider, an honest-but-curious server who stores data con-286
tributed by the owners and executes search queries287
In the next section, we will propose a fast equality test for multi-owner288
search problem adopting multi owner equality test queries [30] while satisfying289
data confidentiality and query privacy290
– Data Confidentiality : users learn the information authorized them to learn291
but nothing else, and the cloud server does not learn about the owners’292
data.293
294
– Query Privacy : queried value is not disclosed neither to the cloud server295
nor to the data owners.296
2.4 The Protocol Description297
In this section, we provide a complete description of our proxy re-encryption298
scheme underlying ElGamal cryptosystem [19]. The proposed scheme consists299
in several phases, described hereafter:300
Setup. On input a security parameter λ, a randomized algorithm is run by301
the Trusted Authority TA to output system public parameters and master302
key.303
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– Setup (1λ): TA takes as input a security parameter λ and picks two304
prime numbers p, q with p − 1 = 2q. It generates a cyclic group G305
with generator g such that G is the unique order q subgroup of Z∗p =306
{1, 2, . . . , p − 1}, and then picks a random key KM uniformly from Z∗q307
to outputs the system master key MK and the corresponding system308
public parameters Param = 〈G, g, q〉.309
310
Global Identity Generation (GId). TA takes as input a set of extra311
attributes for each cargo requested by a certain FF and outputs a global312
identifier (GId) that could be Cargo Id for which a cargo has provable313
credential. Two cargoes with the same extra attributes must receive the314
same GIds.315
316
Key Generation. On input the master key, the TA first runs a random-317
ize algorithm to pick random keys for the data owners and the users and318
correspondingly computes keys for the proxy and the cloud server.319
320
– KeyGen (MK, i, j): For each data owner i and user j, the TA does the321
following:322
323
1. Generates a random value rc and distributes it to the data owners324
and the authorized users.325
326
2. For each ACCi, the TA generates uniformly a random key ki
R←− Zq327
and computes its corresponding proxy side key k
′
i ← MK − ki.328
It then securely distributes ki and (i, k
′
i) to the ACCi and proxy329
server, respectively.330
331
3. For each user j, the TA generates uniformly a random key kj
R←− Zq332
and divides it into two shares kj1 and kj2 such that kj ← kj1 + kj2 .333
The TA computes the user’s cloud side key k
′
j ← MK − kj and334
securely returns keys (j, kj1), kj2 and (j, k
′
j) to the proxy, the user335
and the cloud service provider, respectively.336
337
Data Encryption. On input a booking request from a FF including a338
searchable attribute GId = CargoId, each ACC locally encrypts the values339
of searchable attribute using ElGamal encryption and applies a symmetric340
encryption on the values of extra attributes.341
342
– Enc (ki, Ti): For each tuple t ∈ Ti, the ACCi does the following:343
344
1. Picks a random rt and encrypts the value of serachable attribute345
of each tuple t ∈ Ti namely t.A using ElGaml encryption to output346
C0 = (grt , grtkigt.A).347
348
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2. Creates a metadata consisting of two encrypted values using ElGa-349
mal to obtain350
C1 = (grt , grtkigrt) C2 = (grc , grckigrt)
3. Sets C(t.A) = (C0, C1, C2)351
352
4. Picks a random k¯i and encrypts the value of extra attribute l of353
tuple t ∈ Ti say t.Bl, 1 ≤ l ≤ w to get C(t.Bl) = f(t.Bl)354
355
5. Encrypts k¯i as Ii = (grc , grcki k¯i)356
357
6. Outsources to the proxy server C(Ti) =< C(t.A), C(t.Bl), Ii >,358
1 ≤ l ≤ w.359
360
Data Re-Encryption. On input the encrypted data received from ACCi,361
the proxy re-encrypts data using ACCi’s proxy side key k
′
i. The data re-362
encryption brings all data encrypted with different keys under the same key.363
364
– Re-Enc (i, k
′
i, C(Ti)): For each tuple of C(Ti), the proxy server does365
the following:366
367
1. Finds the proxy side key k
′
i of ACCi368
369
2. Re-encrypts each component of C(t.A) with proxy side key k
′
i using370
ElGamal encryption to obtain371
C∗0 = (g
rt , (grt)k
′
i · grtkigt.A) = (grt , grtMKgt.A)
C∗1 = (g
rt , (grt)k
′
i · grtkigrt) = (grt , grtMKgrt)
C∗2 = (g
rc , (grc)k
′
i · grckigrt) = (grc , grcMKgrt)
3. Re-encrypts Ii with proxy side key as372
I
′
i = (g
rc , (grc)k
′
i · grcki k¯i) = (grc , grcMKk¯i)
4. Set C∗(t.A) = (C∗0 , C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 )373
5. Keeps I
′
i and outsources to the cloud server C
∗(Ti) =< C∗(t.A), C(t.Bl) >,374
1 ≤ l ≤ w375
376
Query Search. An ACC inspector with key kj2 submits its query qv with377
v = Cargo Id in an encrypted form using ElGamal encryption as378
qv = (g−rc , g−rckj2 g−v)
– Q-Search (j, k
′
j , C
∗(Ti), qv): On input the user query qv, the cloud379
server does the following:380
381
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1. Sends user query to the proxy server who re-encrypts the query382
with user’s proxy side key kj1 to get383
q
′
v = (g
−rc , (g−rc)kj1 · g−rckj2 g−v)
q
′
v = (g
−rc , (g−rc)MK−k
′
jg−v)
2. Re-encrypts q
′
v with the user’s cloud side key to output384
q∗v = (g
−rc , (g−rc)k
′
j · (g−rc)MK−k
′
jg−v)
q∗v = (g
−rc , (g−rc)MKg−v)
3. Upon receiving each C∗(Ti) from the proxy server, the cloud ser-385
vice provider finds equality match with the user query value using386
multiplicative homomorphic encryption property of ElGamal cryp-387
tosystem:388
389
– Multiplies C∗0 by C
∗
2 to get R = (g
rt+rc , grt+rcMKgrt+t.A−v)390
391
– Multiplies R by q∗v to get R
∗ = (grt , grtMKgrt+t.A−v)392
393
– Compares R∗ with C∗1 and the match is found if and only if394
t.A = v395
396
4. If the match results set of Ti is not empty, the cloud doses the397
following:398
– Sends a request to the proxy server who partially decrypts Ii399
to get400
I
′′
i = (g
rc , (grc)−kj1 · grcMKk¯i)
– Pre-encrypts I
′′
i with user’s cloud side key to obtain401
I∗i = ((g
rc)−k
′
j · (grc)MK−kj1 k¯i) = (grc , grckj2 k¯i)
– Sends to user side all extra attributes {C(t.Bl), 1 ≤ l ≤ w} of402
C∗(Ti) related to each tuple in the match results set along with403
I∗i404
Data Decryption. An ACC inspector fully decrypts the received I∗405
with its own key kj2 to recover the key k¯ corresponding to extra at-406
tributes as k¯ = (grc , (grc)−kj2 · grckj2 k¯i)407
3 Game Theoretic model: Inspection Games408
As anticipated in the introduction, the operation of the query system described409
in the previous section is far from being costless: the system implies a series410
of economic costs, not only for construction, deployment, maintenance and411
ordinary information update, but also per query computation. We focus on412
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the cost per query, and assume that the cost of a query is incurred by the413
querying agent, in our case an ACC.414
There is a wide literature on the cost of queries in cryptographic distributed415
systems (indeed one of the main assessment metrics for cryptographic proto-416
cols is efficiency) however, the analysis of such costs is out of the scope of the417
present work: here it is important to know that they consist both in commu-418
nication and computation costs and that in some cases the cost of a query419
is considerable. We assume that the expected cost of a query can be esti-420
mated with reasonable accuracy and refer to such a cost by c. For the sake421
of simplicity, we also assume that such cost is essentially the same for every422
query.423
The point is the following: if c > 0, then, depending on the rate at which424
a cancellation corresponds to a multiple reservation, it may or may not be425
economically advantageous for the ACC to adopt an exhaustive audit strategy.426
We develop this point further below.427
3.1 Definitions and assumptions428
For this purpose, let us recall that we use the term contract agreement violation429
or simply violation to indicate a cancellation that results from a multiple reser-430
vation, i.e. from cheating. We call non-violation a cancellation resulting from431
other causes (we do not enter in to the detail of the legitimacy of those other432
causes, since we are interested only in detecting multiple reservations). For433
brevity, here, the contractual agreement that excludes multiple reservations434
will be called the rule. Let us indicate by p the rate at which a cancellation435
operated by the FF correspond to a violation of the rule, and by q the rate at436
which the ACC runs a query, given a cancellation.437
For the sake of simplicity, we can put aside elements that are inessential438
for the reasoning, such as the fact that every cancellation corresponds to lots439
of different sizes (in weight and volume) and thus has a different economical440
value: we assume that every time a FF cancels, it saves an amount b and it441
brings a damage d to the ACC (those assumptions can be lifted subsequently442
with a minor increase in our model complexity). Ideally d (for damage re-443
ceived) represents the pre-agreed forward price of the capacity corresponding444
to the cancelled load – for which the ACC will not receive compensation, if the445
multiple reservation is not proved. On the other hand, b (for benefit received)446
represents the difference between that forward price and the ”spot market”447
price for that capacity: b is the saving that the FF obtains through cheating.448
We assume that, if the violation by the FF is discovered, the FF has to pay449
to the ACC a compensation at least equal to the forward price of the capacity.450
This represents a penalty to FF. This amount is specified in the contract. We451
indicate this amount by a (for amends, in the sense of penalty/fine).452
Let us note, in passing, that b < d ≤ a, this fact however (as the amount453
by which a is greater that d) are inessential for the following discussion: as we454
will see, the parameters a and b alone determine the behavior of the ACC (and455
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b < a is granted by definition), while the parameters c and d alone determine456
the behavior of the FF.457
3.2 Interactive decision landscape458
From the point of view of the ACC, if the expected return from a query459
(which depends on the violation rate) is higher than the damage received,460
then, performing a query on every cancellation, is economically convenient. If461
c < dp (and if p is fixed), the strategy adopted by a rational ACC would be462
deterministic: it would consist in auditing always, i.e. to choose q = 1. Should463
this be the case, there would be no interest from the FF in violating the rule:464
certainty in the detection and in the consequent reparation would discourage465
any attempt and would suppress the multiple reservation phenomenon.466
In practical cases, however, the cost c of a query is high enough and the467
order of magnitude of the violation rate p is low enough for dp being less than c.468
This is mainly due to the fact that cancellations can happen for many reasons,469
most of them legitimate, many of them related to the intrinsic inefficiency of470
a complex system such as the air cargo service supply chain. Since c > dp,471
auditing all the cancellations would not represent a paying strategy for the472
ACC. Thus, the deterministic strategy does not to apply.473
The ACC has to resort to some form of random-sampling based auditing: it474
should audit with probability 0 < q < 1: its problem becomes choosing the op-475
timal q. A rational FF, knowing this, would have room for violating sometimes476
the rule and could do so at random (again for granting non-predictability). The477
number of rule breaking cancellations, compared to the total number of cancel-478
lations, would determine the rate p: the problem of the FF consists in choosing479
its moves so that the value of p is optimal in some sense. Again for the sake480
of simplicity, we assume that the spot market offers enough opportunities to481
the FF to let her set the rate p with no restrictions.482
Clearly, the choice of p by FF and the choice of q by ACC influence not only483
each actor’s own payoff, but also the other actor’s payoff. This interdependent484
decision landscape can be modeled by Game Theory, so as to find the behavior485
that the agents would adopt: under the assumption of full rationality of the486
players, such solution has predictive value. The form of reasoning of rational487
agents that can be applied to the present model is the one studied by John Nash488
in the context of strategic, non-coalitional games. The solution put forward by489
Nash [26] (and later called Nash Equilibrium) stipulates that rational agents490
would adopt a strategy profile (a strategy – here a choice – for each player),491
such that no player could improve its expected payoff by deviating from that492
choice unilaterally.493
3.3 Nash Equilibrium of the two-player Inspection Game494
Being, in our case, the game based on randomization, the solution consists in495
a suitable mix of the two choices by each actor (FF chooses between violating496
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or not, ACC choses between auditing or not). It can be shown that, for mixed497
strategies, the Nash equilibrium always exists and is unique [26]: the equilib-498
rium strategy profile corresponds to the joint choice of the pair (p, q) (p chosen499
by FF and q chosen by ACC), such that the other player is not encouraged500
in modifying the mix unilaterally. This means that one or the other strategy501
does not bring improvement to the actor. This is equivalent to say that the502
right choice of rate by one player is the one that makes the other player indif-503
ferent between its own two choices: FF should choose p so as to make ACC504
indifferent between auditing or not, ACC should choose q so as to make FF505
indifferent between violating or not.506
As mentioned in the Introduction, this is a characteristic trait of a class of507
randomization games known as Inspection Games, whose original formulation508
was introduced by Dresher in 1962 [18] in the context of arm proliferation con-509
trol (for an account see [4], for a generalization to several inspectee and several510
interdependent inspectors see [21]). The case under discussion corresponds to511
an Inspection Game in strategic form (each player takes its decision about the512
rate without knowing the decision of the other player).513
Furthermore, it is a two player game – despite the fact that there are514
several FFs and several ACCs – because each violation by a FF affects only515
the contract with a specific ACC and damages that ACC only: in the whole516
ecosystem of FFs and ACCs, many parallel and unrelated two-player games517
can be played concurrently. It is true that the choice of violating the forward518
contract with one ACC allows another ACC (we call here third party ACC)519
to sell its spare capacity on the spot market, however in this case the third520
party is not a player, in the sense that it has no choice between strategies521
(urthermore not necessarily this third party would receive a benefit from the522
violation: if the market is so active that it would absorb its capacity anyway,523
the third party is indifferent to the choice by the FF).524
In the present two-player case, the equilibrium (p∗, q∗) pair can be found525
by solving algebraically a simple linear system [21]. The solution is526
p∗ =
c
d
q∗ =
b
a
(1)
Notice that, by construction, q∗, which represents the behavioral choice of527
the inspector, is determined by the quantities defining the payoffs of the in-528
spectee, whereas p∗, which represents the behavioral choice of the inspectee,529
is determined by the quantities defining the payoffs of the inspector.530
This solution holds under the hypothesis that the players know the pa-531
rameters of the game (i.e. that this is a game of complete information). This532
assumption can be made confidently: the damage d and the amends a are533
known by both parties by contract; b is known by FF and can be discovered534
by ACC using public spot market information; c is known by ACC and can535
be learned by FF with good accuracy consulting domain experts.536
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3.4 Reduction of the Uncertainty of the variance rate537
The most relevant quantity yield by the above Game Theoretic discussion is the538
predicted rate of violation p∗ (computed based on the costs of inspection c and539
of the the damage d received by the ACC). Knowing this rate, one can reduce540
the relative error in the overall estimate of the cancellation rate. This happens541
because it establishes a constraint between two otherwise unlinked quantities,542
thus reducing the degrees of freedom of the problem, which simplifies the543
estimate: the quantities now linked are the number of cancellations due to544
multiple reservations and the total number of cancellations due to other causes.545
Indeed, more specifically, a revenue manager would normally try to esti-546
mate independently the part of the cancellation rate due to multiple reservation547
and the part of the cancellation rate due to other causes, on the base of the548
fact that the two classes of phenomena are originated by distinct mechanisms.549
The total cancellation rate is defined as550
z =
X + Y
R
= x+ y
where R is a known constant representing the total number of reservations to551
an ACC form a FF, X is the total number of cancellations due to multiple552
reservations, while Y is the total number of cancellations due to other causes,553
whereas x = X/R and y = Y/R. In practice x and y are not known.554
The revenue manager, normally tries to find an estimate xˆ of x and an555
estimate yˆ of y: the two estimates will be affected by uncertainties, expressed556
by the variances σ2(xˆ) and σ2(yˆ), so that the variance of the overall estimate zˆ557
of the cancellation rate, σ2(zˆ) = σ2(xˆ)+σ2(yˆ)−cov(x, y), under the hypothesis558
of independence, will be σ2(zˆ) = σ2(xˆ) + σ2(yˆ). The relative error is defined559
as560
σ(zˆ)
z
=
√
σ2(xˆ) + σ2(yˆ)
x+ y
If, as we did using GT, we find that the quantity X is tied to the quantity561
Y by a fixed ratio p∗,562
p∗ =
X
X + Y
i.e. X =
p∗
1− p∗Y , or x =
p∗
1− p∗ y = ry ,
with r = p∗/(1− p∗), then the overall estimate reduces to the estimate of y:563
z = y (1 + r)
and the relative error on the estimate reduces to the only relative error on y564
σ(zˆ)
z
=
σ(yˆ)
y
This represents a considerable improvement in the estimate, which allows the565
ACC to fine-tune the overbooking rate, thus saving economical resources.566
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4 Discussion and Conclusions567
In this work we have addressed the issue of the air cargo cancellation due to568
multiple reservation by proposing the use of a query system based on a privacy569
preserving cryptographic technique.570
The audit method can be used within a randomized inspection schema,571
which modeled by Game Theory, allows to predict the optimal rate of inspec-572
tion and of cancellation, respectively.573
We show that the prediction of the rate of cancellation due to multiple574
reservations reduces the uncertainty on the overall cancellation rate and allows575
the revenue management of Cargo companies to better tune the overbooking576
level.577
In the future, we plan to develop further this work by a more detailed578
specification of the system based on realistic data from the application domain;579
furthermore, we plan to refine the Game Theoretic model – for the prediction580
of the cancellation rate originated by multiple reservation – by lifting several581
simplifying assumptions adopted in the present paper.582
Finally, we plan to extend the approach also to leverage the private infor-583
mation within the collaborative forecasting of demand, to deter excess reser-584
vation. In the excess reservation problem, the globally unknown information585
concerns the actual capacity demand by the suppliers: this information can586
be however forecast, from information known to freight forwarders, but not to587
carriers (this hidden information consists in the filling of pre-orders and orders588
by the suppliers to the freight forwarder and on the information, through or-589
der tracking, about actual the shipment evolution). Without this kind of data590
the cargo carrier can only rely on historical no-show record of the forwarder,591
to establish the overbooking rate; with these data the carrier would consider-592
ably improve the accuracy of the forecast. It is true that a detailed view by593
the carrier of the data of a single forwarder would violate confidentiality, but594
an aggregated view of the data (possibly with a partial obfuscation) would595
represent a lesser information disclosure; furthermore the resulting forecast596
improvement could be rather profitable. From the profits of this improvement,597
the carrier can draw incentives, and reward the forwarder companies for their598
collaboration. Those incentives could be proportional to the impact of the599
provided information on the improvement of the forecast. The carrier and its600
forwarder company customers would fairly benefit from the adoption of this601
forecast system. In general, although forwarders compete against one another602
and carriers compete against one another, each carrier collaborates with its603
own customers: despite the fact that they have contrasting interests for what604
concerns service levels and prices, they share the interest that the supply chain605
works efficiently. In a future work we will describe one such privacy preserving606
collaborative forecast system.607
A cryptographic cloud-based approach 17
Acknowledgements608
The authors acknowledge the support of the Information and Communication609
Technology Fund (ICT Fund) at EBTIC/Khalifa University of Science and610
Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE (Project number 88434000029). The work was611
partially founded also by the EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-612
gramme, within the projects Toreador (grant agreement No. 688797), Evotion613
(grant agreement No. 727521) and Threat- Arrest (Project-ID No. 786890).614
References615
1. http://www.joc.com/air-cargo/qantas-moves-impose-stiff-fees-late-616
cancellations-air-cargo 19881011.html.617
2. Marco Anisetti, Valerio Bellandi, Ernesto Damiani, Fulvio Frati, Gabriele618
Gianini, Gwanggil Jeon, and Jechang Jeong. Supply chain risk analy-619
sis: open source simulator. In Signal-Image Technology & Internet-Based620
Systems (SITIS), 2009 Fifth International Conference on, pages 443–450.621
IEEE, 2009.622
3. Marco Anisetti, Ernesto Damiani, Fulvio Frati, Stelvio Cimato, and623
Gabriele Gianini. Using incentive schemes to alleviate supply chain risks.624
In Proceedings of the International Conference on Management of Emer-625
gent Digital EcoSystems, pages 221–228. ACM, 2010.626
4. Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard Von Stengel, and Shmuel Zamir. Inspection627
games. Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 3:1947–1987,628
2002.629
5. Mokhtar Bazaraa, Joseph D Hurley, Ellis L Johnson, George L Nemhauser,630
Joel S Sokol, I-Lin Wang, Ek Peng Chew, Huei Chuen Huang, Ivy Mok,631
Kok Choon Tan, et al. The asia pacific air cargo system. The Logistics632
Institute–Asia Pacific, Research paper no. TLI-AP/00/01, http://www.633
tliap. nus. edu. sg/TliapOpeningWebsite/research/white paper634
s document/Air-Cargo-Report-16012001. pdf, 2000.635
6. Valerio Bellandi, Stelvio Cimato, Ernesto Damiani, Gabriele Gianini, and636
Antonio Zilli. Toward economic-aware risk assessment on the cloud. IEEE637
Security & Privacy, 13(6):30–37, 2015.638
7. Matt Blaze, Gerrit Bleumer, and Martin Strauss. Divertible protocols639
and atomic proxy cryptography. In In EUROCRYPT, pages 127–144.640
Springer-Verlag, 1998.641
8. P Ceravolo, S Cimato, E Damiani, G Gianini, C Fugazza, and S Mar-642
rara. Risk management and information disclosure in supply chain analy-643
sis. In Conference on Advanced Information Technologies for Management644
(AITM). Publishing house of the WrocÃlaw University of economics, 2008.645
9. Chris Coppersmith. Airlines, forwarders must work together. Journal of646
Commerce, 4(11):38, 2003.647
10. G. Lena Cota, S. Ben Mokhtar, G. Gianini, E. Damiani, J. Lawall,648
G. Muller, and L. Brunie. Racoon++: A semi-automatic framework for649
18 Gabriele Gianini et al.
the selfishness-aware design of cooperative systems. IEEE Transactions650
on Dependable and Secure Computing, PP(99):1–1, 2017.651
11. G. Lena Cota, S. Ben Mokhtar, G. Gianini, E. Damiani, J. Lawall,652
G. Muller, and L. Brunie. Analysing selfishness flooding with seine. In653
2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable654
Systems and Networks (DSN), pages 603–614, June 2017.655
12. Guido Lena Cota, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, Julia Lawall, Gilles Muller,656
Gabriele Gianini, Ernesto Damiani, and Lionel Brunie. A framework for657
the design configuration of accountable selfish-resilient peer-to-peer sys-658
tems. In Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS), 2015 IEEE 34th Sympo-659
sium on, pages 276–285. IEEE, 2015.660
13. Ernesto Damiani, Paolo Ceravolo, Stelvio Cimato, and Gabriele Gianini.661
Obfuscation for the common good. In Conference on Security in Network662
Architectures and Information Systems (SAR-SSI), pages 15–35. Publi-663
book, 2008.664
14. Ernesto Damiani, Stelvio Cimato, and Gabriele Gianini. A risk model for665
cloud processes. The ISC International Journal of Information Security,666
6(2):99–123, 2014.667
15. Ernesto Damiani, Gabriele Gianini, Florian Kerschbaum, and Richard668
Pibernik. Toward value-based control of knowledge sharing in net-669
worked services design. Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego670
we WrocÃlawiu, (85 Advanced Information Technologies for Management-671
AITM 2009):51–65, 2009.672
16. Ernesto Damiani, Gabriele Gianini, and Marcello Leida. Toward behav-673
ioral business process analysis. In Evolutionary Computation (CEC), 2015674
IEEE Congress on, pages 2347–2353. IEEE, 2015.675
17. Changyu Dong, Giovanni Russello, and Naranker Dulay. Shared and676
searchable encrypted data for untrusted servers. Journal of Computer677
Security, 19(3):367–397, 2011.678
18. Melvin Dresher. A sampling inspection problem in arms control agree-679
ments: A game-theoretic analysis. Technical report, DTIC Document,680
1962.681
19. Taher El Gamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based682
on discrete logarithms. In Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in683
Cryptology, pages 10–18, New York, NY, USA, 1985. Springer-Verlag New684
York, Inc.685
20. F Frati, E Damiani, P Ceravolo, S Cimato, C Fugazza, G Gianini, S Mar-686
rara, and O Scotti. Hazards in full-disclosure supply chains. In Conference687
on Advanced Information Technologies for Management (AITM). Publish-688
ing house of the WrocÃlaw University of economics, 2008.689
21. Gabriele Gianini, Ernesto Damiani, Tobias R Mayer, David Coquil, Harald690
Kosch, and Lionel Brunie. Many-player inspection games in networked691
environments. In Digital Ecosystems and Technologies (DEST), 2013 7th692
IEEE International Conference on, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2013.693
22. Rolf Hellermann. Capacity options for revenue management: theory and694
applications in the air cargo industry, volume 575. Springer Science &695
A cryptographic cloud-based approach 19
Business Media, 2006.696
23. Rolf Hellermann, Arnd Huchzermeier, and Stefan Spinler. Options con-697
tracts with overbooking in the air cargo industry. Decision Sciences,698
44(2):297–327, 2013.699
24. Raja G Kasilingam. Air cargo revenue management: Characteristics and700
complexities. European Journal of Operational Research, 96(1):36–44,701
1997.702
25. Qin Liu, Guojun Wang, and Jie Wu. Clock-based proxy re-encryption703
scheme in unreliable clouds. In Parallel Processing Workshops (ICPPW),704
2012 41st International Conference on, pages 304–305. IEEE, 2012.705
26. John F Nash et al. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of706
the national academy of sciences, 36(1):48–49, 1950.707
27. Lucio Pompeo and Ted Sapountzis. Freight expectations. The McKinsey708
Quarterly, 2:90–99, 2002.709
28. Maryam Sepehri, Stelvio Cimato, and Ernesto Damiani. Privacy-710
preserving query processing by multi-party computation. The Computer711
Journal, 2014.712
29. Maryam Sepehri, Stelvio Cimato, Ernesto Damiani, and Chan Yeob Yeuny.713
Data sharing on the cloud: A scalable proxy-based protocol for privacy-714
preserving queries. In 2015 IEEE TrustCom/BigDataSE/ISPA, Helsinki,715
Finland, August 20-22, 2015, Volume 1, pages 1357–1362, 2015.716
30. Maryam Sepehri, Stelvio Cimato, Ernesto Damiani, and Chan Yeob Ye-717
uny. Data sharing on the cloud: A scalable proxy-based protocol for718
privacy-preserving queries. In Proceedings of the 7th IEEE Interna-719
tional Symposium on Ubisafe Computing in conjunction with 14th IEEE720
Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Commu-721
nications,TrustCom/BigDataSE/ISPA, Helsinki, Finland, August 20-22,722
2015, Volume 1, pages 1357–1362, 2015.723
31. D. H. Tran, H. L. Nguyen, W. Zha, and W. K. Ng. Towards security in724
sharing data on cloud-based social networks. In 2011 8th International725
Conference on Information, Communications Signal Processing, pages 1–726
5, Dec 2011.727
32. Jiang Zhang and Zhenfeng Zhang. Secure and efficient data-sharing728
in clouds. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience,729
27(8):2125–2143, 2015.730
